Collusion
As noted, the possibility of leader-politician collusion complicates the argument presented here. Prior research suggests that collusion exacerbates private predation: Marx et al. (2013) have shown that there are higher levels of private leader predation when public officials and group leaders collude in slums, and LeBas (2013) shows that private militias become more predatory when they partner with the state.
How common is collusion? Previous studies have found that two factors enable collusion: 1) the frequency of interactions between parties and 2) the ability to detect defections from collusive arrangements (Ivaldi et al., 2007) . Most associations in developing countries meet the first condition, since interactions with local politicians tend to be common. However, there may be serious constraints on politicians' ability to detect defections. In Lagos markets, defection would involve a leader under-reporting collected fees to a local politician. It would be very difficult for the politician to ascertain if this were happening. Market leaders have high levels of information about what happens in their group, which is challenging for outsiders to obtain. When firms collude, they develop sophisticated monitoring strategies to detect cheating (Marshall and Marx, 2012) ; I expect the hurdles to circumventing cheating to be substantial in this context. Additionally, as noted in the paper, the group leaders studied here rarely have anything to gain from colluding with politicians. Partnering with the government does not give them more rights or abilities to extort from traders.
The survey discussed in the paper is now part of a panel. The second round was conducted in 2016, and I asked traders: "Have the executives of this association ever colluded with government people in a way that was bad for the traders here?" Given that traders may be reluctant to report collusion, we can assume that if just one trader reported that their market leader had ever colluded, then this is probably true -even if none of the other traders revealed this. Of the 221 associations represented in the 2016 survey, at least one trader in 31 of the associations (14%) surveyed reported that her market leader had colluded in the past.
Even if collusion is rare, when will it be observed? I have conducted a case study of a market that colluded with a local government in a related project (citation not included to anonymize this document). By closely examining this instance of collusion, I inductively identify the conditions that make collusion more likely. This case generates the proposition that collusion will be most likely when a market leader's power is threatened, for example in rare instances when trader mutiny appears on the horizon. In these circumstances, the leader could benefit from colluding with a politician, who might be able to help her retain her position. In the absence of a threat to their power, it is not obvious how a market leader would benefit from collusion.
Distribution of traders by association
I was not able to ex ante identify the universe of market associations in Lagos, as to the best of my knowledge neither the Lagos state government nor any other entity collects this information. As such, I sampled at the individual level, and then determined which traders belonged to the same association. Figure 1 shows the distribution of traders per association. 
Social desirability bias
A potential concern might be that traders are reluctant to speak openly about potentially predatory leaders, especially if other individuals could hear their responses. I asked enumerators to report who else was present during the interview, and 33% said no one else was present. To assess whether I should be concerned about social desirability bias, I conducted a t-test comparing how traders respond when asked about their market association leader based on whether or not others were present during the interview. As shown in Figure 3 , there does not appear to be cause for concern; there is no evidence traders are less critical when others are present, and indeed the opposite might even be the case. Figure A3 : Average responses to questions about market leadership based on whether anyone else was present during the interview. Table A15 : This table shows the relationship between land type and private good governance, aggregating responses at the market association level. The sample size changes across models due to missing data. Controls include whether the market leader holds her position for life, whether the trader has any postsecondary education, the number of employees the trader has, and the value of stock in a trader's shop.
Additional robustness checks
LGA fixed effects indicate the inclusion of local government fixed effects. Robust standard errors are used. 
